The False Alarm Rate (FAR) measures the percentage of forecasted events that did not occur, and it remains one of the key metrics for verifying National Weather Service (NWS) weather warnings. The national FAR for tornado warnings in 2003 was 0.76, indicating that only one in four tornado warnings was verified. The NWS goal for 2010 is to reduce this value to 0.70. Conventional wisdom is that false alarms reduce the public's willingness to respond to future events. This paper questions this conventional wisdom. In addition, we argue that the metrics used to evaluate false alarms do not accurately represent the numbers of actual false alarms or the forecasters' abilities because current metrics categorize events as hit/miss and do not give forecasters credit for close calls. Aspects discussed in this paper include how the NWS FAR is measured, how humans respond to warnings, and what are alternative approaches to measure FAR. A conceptual model is presented as a framework for a new perspective on false alarms that includes close calls, providing a more balanced view of forecast verification.
Introduction
The fraction of all tornado warnings issued by the National Weather Service (NWS) across the United States in 2003 that did not verify was 0.76 (NWS 2005) . In other words, given four tornado warnings, only one was associated with a reported tornado. This fraction is called the false alarm rate (FAR), where a false alarm is "an event . . . forecast to occur but did not" (Wilks 2006, p. 261 ). An ideal forecast would have an FAR of 0.00, but the uncertainties of weather forecasting likely make this an unattainable goal. (Brown et al. 2004) . In contrast, the high FAR associated with tornado warnings indicates the difficulties forecasters face in determining whether convective storms will produce a tornado or not (e.g., Moller 2001, p. 447) and verifying whether such events actually occur (e.g., Speheger et al. 2002) .
One question is whether a FAR of 0.00 is even attainable. One event that was generally considered to be forecast well was the 3 May 1999 tornado outbreak in Oklahoma (see the June 4 2002 issue of Weather and Forecasting devoted to this event). Even for this widely regarded, well-forecast outbreak, the FAR for tornado warnings was still 0.29 (Andra et al. 2002) .
Repeated overwarnings, or a high FAR, are often viewed as problematic in the warning community because of anticipated complacency among the population being warned.
Consequently, NWS policy actively seeks to reduce this measure. For example, by 2010, the goal of the NWS is to reduce the tornado FAR by 0.06 to 0.70 (NWS 2005) . But, as demonstrated by Brooks (2004) , efforts to reduce the FAR may lead to the unintended consequence of lowering the probability of detection. This paper is intended to initiate discussion about the problems in the methods of calculating the FAR and the implications of the stated FAR values and goals. What is a reasonable goal of FAR for various weather phenomena for the NWS? What is an attainable goal for FAR? Does an FAR of 0.76 for tornado warnings imply the NWS is doing a poor job, or does it adequately represent the generally excellent job that forecasters do? Section 2 of this paper discusses how the verification statistics like FAR are calculated by the NWS, including factors that may introduce bias into these statistics. Section 3 discusses the human factors associated with the response to warnings. Section 4 presents a conceptual model that describes warning accuracy, incorporating close calls into the verification statistics. This conceptual model suggests that a more balanced measure of the success of warnings is possible.
Section 5 concludes this paper.
National Weather Service false alarm rates
The FAR is calculated using a 2x2 contingency table (Table 1) . The FAR is defined as the ratio of false alarms, or unverified warnings, to all warnings issued: FAR = Z/(X + Z), where X 5 represents all forecasts that were verified to have occured with the described intensity, spatial extent, and temporal extent, and Z represents all forecasts that did not occur with the forecasted intensity, spatial extent, and temporal extent (e.g., Schaefer 1990 Verifying observations are collected from official NWS storm surveys, official NWS observations from surface observing stations, and unofficial observations from amateur radio operations, newspaper clippings, emergency managers, trained spotters, and the highway patrol.
The resources that are allocated to verification are not as great as those that are allocated for forecasting and warning issuance, hence the reliance on volunteers and unofficial observations. Spotter networks for verification are sparse in many rural areas across the United States; thus, many actual events may go unreported in the verification database. The difficulty in verifying weather phenomena in rural areas may affect the verification statistics, even on a national level.
Forecasters may even be encouraged not to issue warnings in sparsely populated areas because the warning may not verify (e.g., Edwards 2003) . Furthermore, because verification is done by the WFO rather than by an impartial entity, verification is often biased. For example, when a warning is issued, the WFO may make extra efforts to search the volunteer network to find a verifying report. In contrast, if no warning is issued for a potentially missed event, similar efforts to find a report that would verify a missed event are likely not as substantial. Such 6 inconsistencies have the potential to introduce biases in the statistics (e.g., Weiss et al. 2002; Trapp et al. 2006) .
Although the calculation of FAR is well posed mathematically, we argue that the way the statistic is calculated by the NWS fails to give proper credit to forecasters. Specifically, the statistics computed by the NWS are classified as either hits or misses, and the statistics fail to account for close calls (also known as overwarned events). Close calls are defined as "something achieved (or escaped) by a narrow margin" (http://dictionary.reference.com/). Each warning is associated with a specific phenomenon, specific area, and specific time. If an event occurs with slightly less intensity than predicted, just outside of the warned area, or immediately after the warning expiration time, no credit is received for these events. Such events would be considered close calls.
Consider two days with tornado warnings issued for a specific county in the United States.
On the first day, a rotating mesocyclone moves across the county producing damaging winds and large hail, but no tornado. On the second day, sunny skies prevail and no severe weather occurs.
Both days would be counted as false alarms since tornadoes were not verified on either day.
Clearly, the forecast on the first day is better than that on the second day, but the statistics compiled by the NWS would count these two false alarms exactly the same.
Perceptions of false alarms
The human response to warnings for natural hazards is affected by many factors. One factor that academics and practitioners debate is the effect of false alarms. Conventional wisdom is that overwarning reduces the public's willingness to respond to future warnings. In contrast, more recent research indicates the public may have a high tolerance for false alarms. The 7 conventional wisdom is also known as the cry-wolf effect, adapted from Aesop's fable "The Boy Who Cried Wolf." Similarly, Breznitz (1984) defines the false-alarm effect as " "the credibility loss [of a warning system] due to a false alarm." Breznitz (1984) used laboratory experiments to study physical reactions to repeated false alarms, finding that repeated false alarms reduce subjects' willingness to respond.
Evidence for the cry-wolf effect in natural-hazards research, however, has not been forthcoming. Drabek (1986, 77-78) found that Breznitz's (1984) research supporting the crywolf effect fails to account for the effects of social context or media attention that would lend credibility to an event. In studies conducted over a two-year period of several earthquake "nearpredictions" in Los Angeles County, Turner (1983) found that a threat is more credible the more frequently it is discussed, both through media and informal discussion. Atwood and Major (1998) found evidence of both a false alarm effect and a mobilization effect after Iben
Browning's 1990 unofficial false earthquake prediction for the New Madrid Region of the Central United States. Although 46.1% of survey respondents reported a false alarm effect, 16.7% reported a greater concern for future earthquakes. Janis (1962) found that false alarms may not reduce peoples' willingness to take protective actions in future warnings and may even create a higher level of vigilance if there is an understanding of the event and the reason for the warning. Janis (1962) emphasized that increased tendency to follow future warnings is impacted by two major factors: an increase in information and an increase in understanding of one's vulnerability to the hazard. These results were corroborated more recently by Dow and Cutter (1998) in their examination of evacuation behaviors of residents of South Carolina who had experienced false alarm/near miss situations for Hurricanes Bertha and Fran. Dow and 8 Cutter (1998) determined that these experiences did not impact residents' perception of risk;
residents stated that they would make few changes in future evacuation plans. Although Dow and Cutter (1998) did not find evidence of the cry-wolf effect, they highlight that the cry-wolf effect is often a widespread source of speculation and concern within the warning community.
Other studies reiterate that false alarms or close calls are not necessarily detrimental to appropriate responses. A study of a dam-failure false alarm in which 14 000 people were in the inundation zone in Ventura, California, found that, while surveyed populations may have experienced frustrations, the respondents were not negatively affected by the false alarm (Carsell 2001) . Rather, the false alarm provided a learning opportunity of appropriate responses such as attaining knowledge of evacuation plans for future events.
Studies surveying emergency management personnel have found that internal false alarms or close calls do not have negative effects; rather, they can provide learning opportunities to improve warnings, response and protocol, and also to test lines of communication and new technologies (Gruntfest and Carsell 2000; Weaver et al. 2000; Rhatigan et al. 2004 ). Although emergency management personnel's confidence may not be lessened by false alarms, Rhatigan et al. (2004) found that some respondents perceived that the public's confidence would be lessened by a false alarm. In fact, those issuing warnings may be more reluctant to issue warnings for the fear of issuing a false alarm (e.g., Gruntfest and Carsell 2000; Weaver et al. 2000) .
Although overwarning is often viewed as a problem, there may be reasons to warn a larger area than that which will be directly affected. With GPS technology, it is possible to deliver warnings to cell phones based on a precise location. Although a person may not be in the path of the tornado, his/her family or friends may be. For instance, children at a friend's house, a spouse 9 on the way home from work, or an elderly relative may be in the path and be unaware. In this situation, overwarning, or knowing about an event that won't affect your exact location, can enable one to contact family members to make sure they are safe and taking protective actions or ensure that people wouldn't put themselves in the path of the tornado during their activities later that day. How to account for this beneficial aspect of overwarning, however, is not simple.
There is an additional question about whether high FAR for some types of weather phenomena are more acceptable than others. For example, much higher FAR may be tolerated for short-fuse weather events where the amount of time and effort expended by the public may be limited to tens of minutes for a false-alarm tornado warning. In contrast, a high FAR for hurricane evacuations where the disruption and financial expense could be significant may not be viewed the same by the public. Clearly, this is a factor that also needs to be considered.
Despite all this concern about high FAR, the public may not sense that high FARs are a problem. The National Weather Service Customer Satisfaction Survey (NOAA 2005) found that, overall, people are very satisfied with NWS products and warnings and, specifically, were very satisfied with hazardous weather information. Yet, this survey does not ask any questions about perceptions of false alarms or FAR. Although the results of this survey did show that the general public is satisfied with the NWS, the report did not discuss whether the performance measures that are used by the agency as a yardstick to measure success of warnings are the best measures.
The high rating the NWS received in this survey seems to be contrary to the high FARs. Would the public still have high confidence in the NWS if they knew that 76% of tornado warnings were not verified?
Conceptual model
Common definitions and public understanding of false alarms do not mirror the NWS definition of false alarms. The FAR includes events that could not be verified because of occurrence in rural areas where spotter networks are sparse, events that don't meet intensity thresholds, or events that occurred but not within the time frame or geographic locations specified in the warning.
We have developed a conceptual model that presents a broader, more general depiction of warnings for possible events, including false alarms and overwarned events. This conceptual model provides a new framework for viewing the accuracy of warnings, suggesting that close calls are different from false alarms and should be categorized differently (Fig. 1 ). This conceptual model envisions hazardous weather events on a spectrum, ranging from events that occur but are not warned (unwarned events) on one end to events that do not occur but for which a warning is issued (false alarms) on the other. An event that occurs and for which there is a perfect warning, lies in the center of the spectrum (perfect forecast). This model is a way to map a spectrum of events similar to the four-panel contingency Although there are similarities between this conceptual model in Fig. 1 and the contingency table in Table 1 , there is an important difference. Rather than discrete boxes of yes/no, a spectrum is used to demonstrate the range of accuracy of warnings. This spectrum emphasizes that most events do not neatly fit into a yes/no categorization, and can characterize 11 events falling between an actual false alarm and a perfect warning (an overwarned event) or between an unwarned event and a perfect warning (an underwarned event).
The following examples show the elements of this conceptual model.
• were attributed to Elena, and more than 250 homes were destroyed with economic losses totalling $1.25 billion (Case 1986 ).
• Unwarned event: On the other side of the spectrum, an unwarned event occurred in the Many people interpreted these numbers to be the range of possible maximum flood height or that 49 feet would be the absolute maximum flood height, rather than an outlook that gave two possible scenarios with substantial uncertainty. Because many people in these communities interepreted the flood outlook to be the maximum height, people openly blamed the NWS flood outlook for the devastation from the flood and viewed the outlook as an underwarned event when the actual flood topped out at 54 feet.
However, Pielke (1999) determined that the blame for the $2 billion devastation should be shared. The NWS should have more clearly communicated the uncertainty in the flood outlooks, and government officials should have sought to understand the outlooks and accounted for the forecast uncertainty in their own decision making.
• Overwarned event: An example of a close call, or overwarned event, occurred in South Carolina for Hurricane Bertha (July 1996) and Hurricane Fran (September 1996). There were evacuation orders for South Carolina for both hurricanes, but the storms both made landfall farther north, in North Carolina. In both of these hurricane evacuations, the event was less severe than predicted in South Carolina (Dow and Cutter 1998) . Total United States damage was $270 million for Bertha and $3.2 billion for Fran. Twelve lives were lost with Bertha and 26 with Fran (Pasch and Avila 1999).
• Perfect warning: An example of a warning in which the event was more or less as predicted was the 3 May 1999 Oklahoma tornado outbreak. This outbreak had 66 tornadoes, with 58 in the Norman, Oklahoma, WFO warning area (Andra et al. 2001 ).
This outbreak resulted in 45 deaths and 645 injured persons (Brown et al. 2002) . The NWS issued 48 tornado warnings during that event (Andra et al. 2001) . Although many 13 accurate warnings were issued and the event was generally well forecast, this outbreak was not considered a perfect warning according to verification statistics. The FAR for this event was 0.29 (Andra et al. 2001 give credit to forecasters for the many times close calls occur, rather than becoming part of the high FAR. To expect all forecasts to be either a "hit" or "miss," or simply "right" or "wrong," is not realistic; meteorological forecasts do contain uncertainty, and the science of forecasting is not perfect. Although fear of issuing a false alarm, or having a high FAR, may reduce the willingness of forecasters to issue warnings, Gruntfest and Carsell (2000) warn that a focus on reducing false alarms may have the unintended, and far more dangerous impact of missed events.
Events that fall on either side of a perfect warning should be viewed separately from hits or misses and should be viewed as valuable forecasts. Although these events do not occur exactly as predicted, forecasters should be given credit for alerting at-risk populations of a potential
hazard.
This conceptual model deals primarily with false alarms in relation to the intensity of the event. However, false alarms also occur due to spatial and temporal dimensions. For example, Hurricane Fran and Hurricane Bertha were close calls in both intensity and spatial dimensions.
14 Because all three dimensions define the accuracy of a warning, all three dimensions should be considered in the calculation of FAR. An event that occurs within the forecasted intensity, time frame, and geographic location should be considered a perfect warning. However, the current metrics do not account for these factors. For example, a tornado event occurring one minute after the warning expiration should be quantified differently than a tornado event occurring three hours after the warning expiration. Similarly, a tornado event occurring 10 yards outside the warning area should be quantified differently than an event occurring 100 miles from the warning area. Rather than a hit or miss, we suggest that a different value be assigned based on the range in severity, time, and/or space. We suggest that a false-alarm metric that accounts for all three factors (or three metrics that account for one factor each) would be a more accurate representation of forecaster abilities and the overall success of NWS warnings.
Conclusion
Conventional wisdom of false alarms indicates that false alarms reduce confidence in future warnings and that overwarning is problematic. This perception has contributed to institutional goals of the NWS to reduce its FAR. While reducing the number of false alarms is a worthy goal, focusing on reducing this metric could lead to a greater chance of an unwarned event. We suggest two needed improvements in verification and the FAR metric. First, the NWS metrics should be revised to represent the actual number of false alarms and the actual number of close calls according to the three warning criteria (intensity, time, and space). Second, the spotter network for event verification presents a major challenge, especially in areas where populations are sparse. Forecasters should not be hesitant to issue a warning because of fear it will be unverified. Further, FAR in rural areas should be comparable to FAR in urban areas; yet 15 difficulties in verifying events in data-spares regions of the country can contribute to higher FAR in rural areas. A metric that addresses the uneven distibution of spotters should be developed as to not penalize forecasters as much in data-sparse regions of the country.
The conceptual model discussed in this paper demonstrates, through the use of actual events, that there is a gradual difference between a missed event, a perfect warning, and a false alarm.
The conceptual model allows us to view warning accuracy through a new lens and suggests that warning verification should be quantified in a different, more complete manner. Specifically, FAR would more closely represent the success of NWS warnings if close calls were categorized differently than a false alarm or a missed event.
This paper is not intended to be a solution to the high FAR. Rather the conceptual model presented in this paper is designed to serve as a framework to reevaluate the current methodology for determining FAR. Whether one examines the national FAR for tornado warnings (0.76) or the FAR of an event (e.g., 0.29 for the 3 May 1999 Oklahoma tornadoes), this measure does not represent the success of the warnings as perceived by the public. Rather than focusing on improving the national FAR for tornado warnings to 0.70 within the current evaluation system, perhaps this system should be examined and improved metrics should be developed to be "more useful to our customers and… more accurately represent NWS performance" (NWS 2005) .
Consequently, the next step is to use this conceptual model to propose revised metrics that more accurately represents the success of warnings, thereby providing the NWS customers with a more useful measure of the performance of the NWS. We envision a spectrum of performance measures that range from very stringent (as the present system is now where the event must occur exactly in the space, time, and intensity it was predicted to be) to more lenient 16 measures that reflect public perceptions of forecast success through overwarned events or close calls. By doing so, we feel the NWS will provide a more accurate depiction of the success of its warning program to the public. Figure 1 . Conceptual model of warning accuracy. 
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